28 Nov 1809

Parl Reform

Necessity

Ch. Division of power

1

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Ch. < > The division of power is not of itself a security against mis-rule

Ch. < > The division of power is no otherwise a security against misrule than in so far as it tends to place /render/ the holders of power in a state of dependence /dependent/ on /under/ the people.

'.1. Sole and sufficient security against misrule, dependence of power-holders on the people.

Division of power - check - controul, ballance - all these terms are in use to be employed, to give intimation of a state of things by /in virtue of/ which if matters be adjusted as they are capable of being, not only absolute /arbitrary/ government but misrule in every shape may be effectually prevented.

That this good effect /happy result/ may be secured without any recourse to the body of the people without any regard paid to the opinions the interests or affections of the people is not expressly said: but inasmuch as so far as this argument /recourse[?]/ goes nothing is said about the people, this nullity /disregard/ of the people in /throughout/ the whole business seems to be implied; for if by any division of power among the members of /a few individuals, comprising/ a minute portion of the people, if by this expedient the object be really accomplished or though not actually and compleatly accomplished, it is needless to look for any other. It is needless: and forasmuch as to the body of the people no recourse can ever be had without considerable inconvenience, if it were only in the shape of expence of time and labour repeated[?] upon so vast a multitude, whatsoever is in this way unnecessary may be safely set down as pernicious.