3 Dec r 1809 +

Parl y Reform

Influence

Ch.1. Explanations

'.3 Dependence most mischievous

3

{This[?] reason is an arithmetical one: if no dependence, no more than one instance of undue obsequiousness is produced by one complex operation: if dependence, as many instances as the nature of the case /situation/ produces during the man's continuance in it.}

dependence apart, the effect of the undue influence is but occasional and momentary: but, if dependence be the fruit of it, the effect is permanent, continuing as long as the dependence continues, and producing on the part of the corrupted trustee as many instances of breach of trust as the corruptor has occasion to call for during that length /span/ of time.

Of the two species of political trust viz. that of the member of parliament, and that of the parliamentary elector, it is in the situation of member of parliament that in which influence undue influence is beyond comparison in an almost infinitely greater degree most apt to be productive of this pernicious fruit. Why? - Because, a vote /the act of voting/ being in both cases /situations/ the act by which the power is exercised, the number of votes which within a given space of time it may happen to a Member of parliament to give is beyond comparison greater than the greatest number which it can happen to a parliamentary elector to give. Under the system of septennial parliaments, casualties apart, a parliamentary elector as such does not find it in his power to be corrupt /violate that his trust/ oftener than once in seven years,