13 Oct r. 1809

Parl y Reform

B.II. Influence

Ch.1. Explanations

'.2. Influence on understanding

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3. Authority as a sort of circumstantial evidence

4. Instruments of fascination

{'.2. In the understanding /intellectual part of the mental frame/ are two distinguishable faculties the judgment or the imagination to either of which the action of influence is capable of being directed: or perhaps it may be more correct to say that when /whenever/ mind /the understanding/ is acted upon by the influence of mind, it is in both cases on the judgment that the influence is exerted, but that the influence so exerted may have applied itself to the judgment either immediately, or through the medium of the imagination.}

Whether the instrument applied be of the logical case, or of the rhetorical case, no influence can it have /exert/ on the understanding but through the medium, and as it were by the presentation of some motive. This motive will commonly be either of the nature of hope, i.e eventual expectation of good, or of the nature of fear, i.e. eventual expectation of evil: and forasmuch as, in proportion to /respect of/ the magnitude of the evil indicated as eventually about to have place, the fear exerted or endeavoured to be exerted, how calm and un-impassioned and logical soever may be the cast /complexion/ of the argument employed, may rise to any pitch, so accordingly it is not merely and exclusively by arguments of the rhetorical cast, but sometimes even by arguments of the purely logical cast, that this or that passion may come to be exerted[?], and the strength of the motive indicated /brought to view/ /put in action/ encreased /raised/ in consequence.

Good. i.e. either pleasure certain or contingent, or exemption from pain.

Evil: i.e. either pain, certain or contingent, or loss of pleasure. See Evidence: B.II. Motive Table: and Introd. Ch.