7 Aug 1809

Parl. Ref

Ch. Necessity Hume

2

2

His argument lies within a small compass. It is necessary that a part, and that a considerable one of the Members of the House of Commons should be in a state of dependence on the crown. Why? - Because if they were not - if every one were at liberty to follow his own judgment in other words at his own will - i.e. that which would be his own will, but for such dependence, the House of Commons would of course conquer the other powers of the state, viz. King and Lords, and become absolute. This theorem is his antecedent: and his consequent conclusion his practical inference is of course - therefore there ought to be always a portion of the House of Commons in a dependent state. (a)

For my own part I can not agree with him in any one part of this argument: neither in the /his/ antecedent nor in his conclusion.

His conclusion I speak to first: but only for the purpose of laying it out of the case.

If it were ever so clear that but for this dependence with the corruption by which it is produced the House of Commons would conquer the King and the House of Lords and so convert the government into a Commonwealth I had rather it were so, than that matters should continue in their present train. Why? because in my view of the matter, supposing things to continue in their present train, the government would sooner or later /ere long/ be converted into a sort of mixt despotism composed of Monarchy and Aristocracy, with the same /the still more effectual/ irresponsibility I mean impunity for malpractice as in the case of a pure monarchy, and with a heavier train of ill-bestowed and otherwise unnecessary expence, and thence with a heavier pressure in all shapes and in particular in a pecuniary shape, upon the body of the people.

(a)  Quote the passage at the bottom of the margin.