1818 Oct. 26

Parl. Reform Bill

Reasons

'.2 Electors Who

Univ

III. Taxedness

6

2. According to this theory it is fit that the faculty of contributing to the choice of those functionaries whose office it is to apply a check and controul to the exercise of the powers of /exercised by/ another functionary, the Monarch should not be absolute fixt and secured to those electors themselves but dependent for its existence partly on the set of persons annually[?] chosen by them partly upon the functionaries to the exercise of whose powers it thus belongs to them to apply a check: and on[?] whom[?] will it will in some way or other depend when the exercise of the elective function shall be possessed. With the concurrence of the Lords House and of the Commons House both of them so notoriously subject to and their conduct determined by his influence, he may tax when he pleases he may forbear to tax /avoid taxing/ when he pleases.

3. On each occasion whether the person in question shall be admitted to give a vote depends not immediately upon the law which has undertaken to determine who shall and who shall not vote, but upon the interpretation given to that law, and thence upon the evidence which shall or shall not be required and admitted to give effect to that right. But by the influence of will on will exercised over the wills of those by whom it is determined what evidence shall and what shall not be received /accepted/ as sufficient - acceptance or rejection /non-acceptance/ of - vote may there be, and but too often has been /as but too often it has been/, determined by his pleasure, as that has been determined by his separate and sinister interests.