7 Oct. 1809

Parl y. Reform. P t. 1. Necessity –

Chapters and Sections

Ch. 1. Plan of this work

§.1. Objects of this work

§.2. Radical grievance Dependence of the House of Commons on the King. Nov. 1816 This

is not the evil itself but its cause.

§.3. Pleas in belief of the Dependence stated.

Ch. 2. Kings separate interest – general view of it.

§.1. K. gs separate interest why held up

to view

§.2. K. gs separate interest – shapes in which it acts.

Ch.3. King’s interest as to to Power – what power he ought to have.

§.1. Power as to 1 measures – 2. – men.

§.2. What power the King ought to have as to each.

Ch. 4. King’s interest as to power continued – What power he ought not to have. (See Ch 13.)

§.1. Powers not properly exercisable by the King

§.2. Pitt y r[?] – his notions accorded with the above.

 Here or further on?

§.3. No medium between the Kings absolute power and the above limitations.

Note on continuing[?] Kings here or elsewhere?

Ch.4. continued.

§.4. King’s inviolability and indismissibility depend upon his impotence.

Ch. 5. Kings interest as to power continued – his sinister interest.

as to d o.

§. 1 King’s sinister interest as to 1. Measures

§. 2. King’s sinister interest as to 2. patronage

Marginals have only §.6

Ch. 6. King’s interest as to power continued.

his sinister interest as to sources of power.

§.1. King’s sinister interest as to war.

§.2. – as to Colonies and dependencies in general

§.3. – as to Penal Colonies

§.4. – as to ill-governed home-possessions.

§.5. Limits to Kings power of patronage

Ch. 7. King’s interest as to 2. Money

§.1. Money how far the object of his public, how far of his sinister interest.

§.2. Admiralty Droits.

§.3. Greenwax.

§.4. Exemption from War-Taxes.

Ch. 8. King’s interest as to 3. Ease.

§.1. Ease, how far the object of his public, how far of his sinister, interest.

§.2.

Ch. 9. King’s interest as to 4. Reputation.

§.1. King’s reputation, what publicly useful, what sinister.

§.2. Mischief of undue reputation in the Kings case

§.3. Kings interest in the means of reputation

Ch. 10.

Kings interest as to 5. Vengeance.

§.1 Sinister how much, i.e What fit, what unfit.

§.2.

Ch. 11. Kings sinister interests – their mutual subservience.

Ch. 12. Sinister interest of the King’s subordinates.

§.1. Shapes in which the sinister interests of the Kings

subordinates act.

§.2. Natural confederacy among the several subordinate possessors of sinister

interest.

§.3. Sinister interests as to war exemplified.

{{ Topics of the Chapters Stated.

I. Radical grievance dependence of Commons on King

N.B. This dependence /The mischief/ depends on the existence of a separate interest

on King’s part. Insert here from Plan – Explanations – Mischief of Commons dependence

Ch. 1.

II. Kings sep. interest, its different branches –

Ch. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9 10. 11. thence unfitness as to probity

III. D o of this subordinate. Ch.12.

IV. King’s unfitness as to intelligence. Ch. 13.

V. Necessity of an adequate check to King’s power, governed

by his separate interest. Only such check, his dependence

on the people, thro’ their representatives. Ch. 14.

VI. Burke’s opinion assuring Kings unfitness, and thence the necessity of his

constant dependence on the people. Ch. 15

VII. Unless the king be thus constantly dependent, his power will encrease to

despotism and his sinister interest govern without controul. Ch. 16

VIII. Inadequacy of other checks upon the King’s absolute power. Ch. 17. }

IX. Particular necessity of King’s constant dependence to the prevention of

unnecessary wars. Ch. 19.

{ King can not be dependent on people but in so far as their representatives are Ch.

Taking representatives out of dependence on King and rendering them in part[?] dependent as formerly on their property in part independent of every body the main object of

Parliam. Reform. }}

{ X. King would naturally[?] be in a state of adequate dependence on people, of

representatives, instead of being either independent or dependent on people, were not

dependent on King.

XI. Necessity of taking them out of the improper dependence and placing them under

the proper one.

XII. For this purpose intelligendum how /by what means[?]/

the dependence is established. }

{ XIII. Corruption and bribery by and to whomsoever applied

are no otherwise productive of considerable mischief, than in as far as they are

contributory to this anticonstitutional dependence. }

XIV. By the means necessary to do away the greatly mischievous corruption, the other

modes will be done away.

XV. The arrangements necessary to place the dependence of Members on the proper

footing as above may be so ordered as to be productive of divers collateral and

subordinate and collateral good effects.