[clxiv. 217]

1820 July 4

Emancipation Spanish

As to the representatives of the people, /what their power does/ instead of applying to the power of the Monarch a limit beneficial to the people, and thence serving or helping to promote the coincidence of his single interest with the universal interest and thence with his duty what they do, and as yet but too effectually is to serve as a cloak to the power of the Monarch, and thus rendering it by so much the more easy to sacrifice to that same single interest together with other narrow and thence sinister interests the universal interest.

A body of men, by whatsoever name stiled, whether representatives or any thing else, are no /can not be any/ otherwise of use to the people than in so far as at the least in a number sufficient at all times to determine the direction taken by the acts of the whole body they are as above, in fact as well as in name trustees for the people, agents of the people, as such appointed by the people, at short intervals removable by the people, and by such removal at least punishable by the people.

The consequence is that, except in an indirect way and by accident, as will be shewn presently, and only for a time to which it is always in their power to put a period at a minutes warning, the people derive no benefit whatsoever from the power which these pretended representatives have in their hands.

On the contrary, as will be shewn in the next place, they are all the worse for it. For as the King /Monarch/ with all his military power could not without the aid of these pretended or treacherous Trustees extract out of the people so much money as he can and does with their assistance, he is by this means /in this way/ forced to allow to them a share in the powers of government. But this share they will not add /lend/ to his without being let into a share of the money which he extracts by their means. And thus it is that while the people are kept subject to them by coercive force, their self-stiled representatives are kept subject to them by corruptive influence. So much money as is necessary to the keeping them subject to this corruptive influence, and thereby securing on their part a constant breach of their trust, so much money therefore he must extract from the people, over and above that which for the support of his power it would be necessary for him to extract, if no such treacherous or sham trustees were in existence.