9 Nov r 1811

Evidence

1 Theoretic

Ch Foundation Causes

§ .2. Hume's vividness

3

According to David Hume alone of any supposed matter of fact the idea which his plan in a mans mind is to a certain degree vivid, the supposed matter of fact is by that same man believed: if the vividness has not risen to that necessary degree, the matter of fact is not believed, belief in regard to it has no place.

On this occasion the state of the mind called disbelief seems scarcely to have presented itself to his notice: by the affirmative phases of persuasion viz the opposite case belief his attention seems to have been engrossed. Had the two equally existing modes of persuasion obtained each of them that equal/share of attention which was its due, the need of looking out for some common term, equally applicable to both, such as the word persuasion would naturally have presented itself to so acute a mind.

In respect of conception or memory or both degree of vividness the sole difference between belief and disbelief or rather between belief and un-belief. Such was Humes theory. How stands the matter of fact, as testified by memorial[?] experience? an experience to which hurried away by the warmth of the philosophical pursuit his attention could never find the opportunity for applying itself.