5 Sept 1815 B 

Jug True

4

Ch Credence

1

(1)

Neither of any one of the occurrences of which mention is made in the body of history in this assemblage of historians here in question nor of any other occurrence whatsoever can the abovementioned suppositions be all of them true. Several of them it will be seen are mutually incompatible. But (such as they are there) there is not one of them the truth of that to us time of day is not more probable than the existence of every thing to which the name and character of a miraculous miracle. A miracle is any occurrence which is unconformable to what is known to be the ordinary (and [...?]) course of nature. To the occurrences viewed in the point of view as represented by any one of these suppositions no unconformity to the ordinary course of nature is exhibited. From the very definition of probability it will therefore follow that so long as in any one of those suppositions any the least degree of probability is to be found, the verity of any proposition by which that supposition is said to have had place and as the occurrence is related to have been been exemplified will always possess a better title to credence than a proposition by which the existence of the fact in the character of a miraculous one is affected or affirmed.

7.

In the instance of no one of these reputed miracles can all the above mentioned disprobative circumstances be all of them exemplified.

8.

But neither is there any one of them that is not less improbable than the working of a miracle. A miracle is unconformable to the known ordinary course of nature. These are, every one of them, conformable to it. From the very definition of probability each of them is therefore less improbable than a miracle.