[036-142v]

1822 Feb. 18

Codification Offer

'.5.

VI.

2

Each rationale is a grind-stone for the nose of the tyrant /In each Code with its rationale the nose of the tyrant the nose of the corruptionist may be made to feel a grindstone. No public meeting can there be in which it will not be in the power of any man to hold them to it./ Even the greatest happiness principle is that same implement in miniature.

A key, a lamp, a standard measure, a bridle an anchor, a grindstone the rationale is /may be seen/ a talisman that upon occasion assumes all these forms

To /By/ that portion of the aggregate of legislative power which is in the hands of the delegated representatives of the people to that and alone is that bridle in any immediate way applied the demand for which is in the case of every branch of power so indispensable. The /By the proposed/ unlimited assemblage of the proposed original draughts with their respective rationales the bridle will apply to every other functionary by whom any portion is possessed /shared/ in the power of legislation by whom any portion of legislative power is possessed and exercised: by the Monarch for example, of /and/ that one of his Ministers by whom under a Constitution which admitts of such interference any such original draught may come to be produced, and to be submitted to those by whom the /any ulterior/ remaining portion of legislative power is possessed and exercised. On this functionary /In this case/ though on one account the force of the bridle will be less than in the preceding case, on another account it will be greater. The circumstance by which it is diminished is the want of that personal contact which on various occasions is [...?] to have place between the delegated representatives of the people and their Constituents. The circumstance by which it is encreased is the superior degree of responsibility which as will shewn presently has place in the case where the hand by which a law as a measure of government is brought forward is but one compared with the case in which a number of hands greater than one have each of them a part in the business.

[xxxvi. 142]

1822 June 28

Constitut Law Rationale

Supreme Operative

II Monarch Limited

II. Inaptitude in /attached to/ the situation of Monarch in a Mixt or say Limited Monarchy the power having for its instrument of limitation the power of a body acting as a Representation of the people.

1. Inaptitude opposite to Moral aptitude

In this situation compared with the forementioned the causes of enmity are more active: of resistance the appearances /symptoms/ are continually obtruding themselves on observation. Though on every occasion the office is out of hazard on every occasion a contest with circumstances of irritation has place

To moral inaptitude in the shape of cruelty is in this situation necessarily added, immorality in the shape of insincerity and deception. The Representation of the people is a state of corruption - the people themselves are in a state of delusion If the Representation were not in this state of corruption, no such Office as the Kingly Office could continue. If the people in a vast proportion were not in a state of delusion no such Office as is the Kingly Office could continue.

Of that portion of the mass of the external instruments of felicity which otherwise might be and in the situation of absolute Monarch would be employed by him in the endeavour how vain so ever to make an ulterior addition to his own felicity a portion more or less considerable must be employed in the keeping in a state of perpetual corruption, and perpetual subserviency to his sinister interest the representatives /Delegates/, real or pretended of the people, in securing on their part a constant breach of such their trust. In the majority these men the people in so far as they see clearly behold their determined and implacable enemies /their enemies/: subordinate depredators who concurr with /under the orders of/ the supreme depredator, and before all things occupied with him - in the work of /exercise of/ depredation at their charge. In the eyes of the Monarch they are at the same time his enemies: partly because because the quantity of the matter of depredation seized by them is never adequate to his desires, partly on account of the vast share which he finds himself under the necessity of parting with for their /abandoning to their/ use, in consideration of that part which in fulfilment of the sinister contract, it is necessary should be performed on their part or his will could not be done.

[036-143v]

1821 Nov. 28

Codification Offer

'.12 Rulers aptitude

Rudiment to be rewritten

In the proving shewing the grounds of the several positions that for the original draught there ought to be but one draughtsman that this draughtsman should be a foreigner and that the labour of /to the service performed/ author of this draught no special remuneration at the public expence ought to be attached it has been necessary to shew that in the situation of those on whom acceptance for the draught would in the first instance depend the interest of all persons is adverse /stands opposed/ to the such acceptance.

To a first view on the part of the author of a proposal such as this, the course thus taken is taken /operates/ in counteraction of his own declared and indubitable existing wish

On a second view however this will be seen not to be the case Yes - if so it were that but for the information thus given to them there were any to whom this state of interests were a secret. But this is what can not be. The only class of persons to whom it could be a secret is that of the subject many, their Constituents.

For counteracting the influence of this sinister influence the only course that could be taken was the drawing a side the veil with which in the eyes of the subject many it probably for the most part remains still covered.

By this means supposing the proposal rejected by Representatives, the appeal goes instanter goes of course to their Constituents. And the appeal will never be at an end So long as the rejection continues, this Proposal will rise up in judgment against them.

It /This/ is of the number of those cases in which all hope of doing any thing but by force of evil by threats producing fear or evil is groundless.

[xxxvi. 143]

1822 June 28

Constitut. Code Rationale

Supreme Operative

Monarchs in general

Magnitude or Stability

At all times, until the Old man of the woods has been shaken off from the shoulders of Sinbad in every wood upon the earth, in every Monarchy one and the same option and that in both parts a disastrous one will be presenting itself to the Monarchs choice: the option between magnitude and stability /In some eyes/ Encrease of stability will /may by some/ be seen /provided for/ in the expedient of imparting a share of power either to a Representation of the people alone, or to a self-representing Aristocratical body, or to both together.

[xxxvi. 144]

1822 July 16

Constitut. Code Rationale

Supreme Operative

I Monarch absolute

II Monarch Limited

III Aristocracy

IV Monarcho-Aristocracy

1. Borough-mongers subject.

2 Why spoken of as paramount.

?. In a limited say rather a mixt Monarchy, the Aristocracy are not in practice co-equal with but dependent on and instruments of the Monarchy.

In England the Borough-mongers are under the King not the King under the Borough-mongers.

The King (it has been said) is in a state of subjection to the Borough-mongers. The party by whom this notion is adopted is the party of the people: it is on every occasion assumed, and argued upon as a principle. In relation to it, two questions will here present themselves. 1. Is it correct?: 2. Correct or /If/ incorrect to what cause is the use made of it to be attributed /what is the cause of its currency?/

Question 1. Is it correct /true/? Answer. It is not. /untrue./ That they /the two powers/ act not in constant union, thus far is true. But, on each occasion whatsoever be the course taken by the union, it is by the will of the King not by the will of any power that that course is determined: not by the will of any other power whatsoever be the situation of it, or by what name so ever denominated.

By Borough-mongers are meant the aggregate of the several individuals by whom the seats in the Commons House are filled. The cause why this denomination is employed will be mentioned in its place.

What is here assumed is - that the Lords House in its corporate capacity is in fact /practice/ in a state of subjection to the Commons House. Thus much is true, manifest and undisputed. ( Quere whether to state the proofs)

What is also assumed is that in a very large proportion the occupiers of the seats in the Commons House are located by individuals who have seats in the Lords House. This also is manifest and undisputed.

[xxxvi. 145]

1822 July 19

Constitut. Code Rationale

Supreme Operative

I. Monarch absolute

II. Monarch Limited

III. Aristocracy

IV Monarcho-Aristocracy

The simple truth of the matter is this. It is by force and intimidation that the conduct of the people at large is determined. It is by corruption /corruptive influence/ that the conduct of the majority in each of the two Houses of Parliament is determined: in the House of Commons in the first instance, and then in the House of Lords: the will of the Lords following of course that of the King and the Commons

But the matter of corruption - on whose will does the application of it depend? On that of the Minister. And the Minister - on whose will does his continuance /existence/ in that situation depend? On the Kings.

Let the King give to what man he will the disposal of the matter of corruptive influence, the will of that individual is sure to be confirmed /done/ by the majority in both Houses

Events may happen - events which for a time may make the King see his /a/ convenience in substituting to a Minister more agreable to him a Minister less agreable to him. But in this temporary exception there is nothing that detracts from the truth, to all practical purposes, of the general rule. In this there is nothing more than what is every now and then happening in the most absolute governments, that of Turkey not excepted.

[xxxvi. 146]

1822 July 16

Constitut. Code Rationale

Supreme Operative

I Monarchy absolute

II. Monarchy Limited

III. Aristocracy.

IV. Monarcho-Aristocracy

But /Be this as it may/ the fact is - that whatsoever is done, it is with the Kings will that it is done: in each instance it may or may not have originated in the Kings will: but in whose will so ever it /what is proposed/ originated, if it be against the Kings will it is not done

The question here is - what in this respect is the general and habitual course of the government: Of the few exceptions, that by careful inquiry might perhaps be found, the effect will rather be to prove the rule than to disprove it. No Monarchy so absolute, but that exceptions in this or that instance might be found in it

Of the absoluteness of the Kings power, a conclusive proof is /was/ that which was brought /held up/ to view in a Commons House Debate in the Session of 1822 ? Motion by Mr Brougham: object of it, holding up to view what is called the influence of the Crown: that is to say the absoluteness of the King's power in respect of giving determination to the proceedings of the two sets of functionaries who in profession and form are sharers with him in the supreme operative. Proof this. The Prime Minister is the nominee and instrument When once a man has been decidedly located in the situation of Prime Minister, the Commons House a vast majority of it vote according to his will, after having but a few days before namely when he was not Minister but in opposition voted against it

? June 1822. Black Dwarf July 3 1822.

[xxxvi. 147]

1822 July 19.

Constitut. Code Rationale

Supreme Operative

I

II

III

IV. Monarcho-Aristocracy

Instances have happened in which the King has discarded a Prime Minister /Minister/ whom he had rather have kept, and appointed /placed/ a Prime Minister whom he had rather not have appointed. True: but the Prime Minister /Minister/ who was not agreable to him never for any considerable length of time has he been kept in Office (a)

Ao 1806 Lord Grenville, Mr Fox and Mr Addington were in Office together. Lord Grenville and Mr Fox were more disagreable to the then King: Lord Grenville on one account; Mr Fox on another: Lord Grenville from his personal demeanour: Mr Fox from the too great popularity of the principles professed by him. Mr Addington was a man found to be agreable to a King, whosoever the King were. A favorable opportunity for getting rid of them was watched for, and found. Lord Grenville was dismissed: Mr Fox was dismissed. Mr Addington was retained It was the desire of Lord Grenville that the oppression under which the Catholics had so long been suffering should be removed; this was also the desire of Mr Fox. But the will of the King was opposite and inflexible. He refused to adopt the measure, and dismissed /rid himself of/ the authors.

[xxxvi. 148]

1822 July 19

Constitut. Code Rationale

Supreme Operative

I. Monarch absolute

II. Monarch limited

III. Aristocracy

IV Monarcho-Aristocracy

In England ever since the accession of the first English born King after /since/ the Revolution viz. George the 3 there has been a party in opposition to the Minister of the Kings choice, and thereby to the King. The Ministry for the time being they could not /have never been able to/ attack without attacking in some part or other the system of abuse and sinister sacrifice, and thereby and so far serving the cause of the people. But in so far as they have so done they have been giving constant offence to the King which their more prosperous antagonists have been occupied in the doing of his will in so far as it has been done. In the very nature of the case /their situation/ they could not therefore do any thing against the King and his Minister without doing something for the people, and professing some principle by which a sort of continual warrant could be afforded for whatsoever they were doing. This principle however never could be the greatest happiness principle since by that if followed up with any consistency, the grand and universal and constant object of their wishes would be reduced to that which would be nothing in their eyes. Prevented then from being either Absolute Monarchists or Democrats they have been all along confined to a middle course by which they were determined to be Aristocrats. According to them the form of government must remain the same: for to their interest the preservation of it is not less necessary than to the interest of the men in power their antagonists. But the hands in which the power is must be different: they must be their hands: and when in their hands the form must be such as will keep it there: an Aristocracy of which they were /are/ Members must be not only formed /continued/: but strengthened: strengthened in such sort that to displace them shall be no longer in the King's power. Such accordingly was the object of the East India Bill brought in by Charles Fox in the course of the short reign to which this Bill put an end. The object of it was to transfer the Patronage of that government into their hands.

[xxxvi. 149]

1822 July 19

Constitut Code Rationale

Supreme Operative

I

II

III

IV Monarcho-Aristocracy

By the will of the Minister, be he who he may so long as it is decided that he is to continue Minister have the wills of the majority in both Houses been at all times determined: and such will be the state of wills, so long as the Government remains in the form it wears at present. Why? because such is the state of interests - of interests and of the means of affording satisfaction to the correspondent desires