[xxxvi. 164]
1822 July 1.
Constitut. Code Rationale
Supreme Operative
Body - why no 2d?
Q. The Supreme Operative power why in a single body, and not in two bodies or more
Answer. Determining Principle
1. Avoidance of needless Delay, say in one word dispatch
2 Avoidance of needless Expence - Say in a word Frugality.
Exposition of the Rationale of these principles
Shewn already as follows
1. The hands in which the supreme operative power is lodged ought to be located and dislocated by the great body of the people
2. The hands in which this power is lodged ought to be not those of a single individual but those of a numerous body
3. Of this body the Members ought to be located and dislocated by the Electors of so many Territorial Districts into which for this purpose the whole territory of the State ought to be divided.
That point /position/ being considered as established comes now the question whether the institution of one such numerous body being determined upon, one or other or any more than one other ought to be added.
The answer is - Not so much as one other: in which answer is included a negative upon every greater number
If in addition to this first body there be a second, this second will either be a body having an interest not opposite in any way to the interest of the great body of the people, or a body having an interest opposite in this or that way to the interest of the people. Under the greatest happiness principle to say that among the functionaries sharing in the supreme operative power a body having an interest opposite [...? ...? ...?] of the people ought not to have place is as much as to say that it is against the interest of the people to be under the government of men having an interest opposed to theirs and in a condition to give effect to that particular interest at the expence and by the sacrifice of that universal interest.
There remains therefore as the sole subject of the question, a second body having an interest the same as that of the people - the identity or coincidence between the two interests being provided for in the case of this second body upon the same principles as in the case of the first.
[xxxvi. 165]
1822 July 2
Constitut Code
Supreme Operative
I. Monarch
Instruments
Vain would it be to say evil in all these shapes is the effect of men in general of government in general not of Monarchy in the persons of the Monarch and his instruments.
No: they are not the effects of government they are only the effects of misgovernment. They are not the effects of government For a Representative Democracy is a Government: the Anglo American United States are a Representative Democracy and in the United States, no such evil effects have place
[xxxvi. 166]
1822 July 17
Constitut Code
Supreme Operative
I. Monarchy
Instruments incorporeal
4. Delusion. 5. Fiction
If their own law were a proper one all Borough-mongers ought to be hanged!
By those obtaining money by persuasion is punished by
death.
?. Fiction - an instrument of Misrule in limited Monarchy - its relation to Corruption
and Delusion
Incorporeal instruments of misrule
Shall Fiction be added to the list? With respect to the four others it is altogether
disparate: for it is not produced by the same efficient causes - by money power and
factitious honor Though not the sister of Delusion It is however in one /a certain/
sense the offspring of that evil offspring /genius/. Fiction men have actually been made
to regard as an instrument apt and necessary to good government in general and to good
judicature in particular.
So mischievous an error where shall the efficient cause of its prevalence be found?
Answer in Delusion /Delusive influence/. By The same causes that delusion has been
produced has this preeminently mischievous error been produced By delusion by the
several efficient causes of delusive influence above mentioned men have been led to
regard as their best /natural and good/ friends protectors guardians their most
implacable and irresistible enemies namely Kings and Judges and Advocates placed over
them by Kings.
To give /For giving/ effect to the system of depredation and oppression concerted
between the arch depredator and these his instruments, they have woven a tissue of
falshood a mass /dose/ of poison in the shape of falshood and with the name of fiction
which by the stupid ignorant patience of the people they have been suffered to inject
into every vein of the body politic and thus added this source of corruption to the
other.
[xxxvi. 167]
1822 July 17
Constitut Code
Corruption and Delusion are necessary concomitants to each other: the same cause /causes/ that produce the one produce the other likewise - the corruption can not exist but the delusion /must/ exists likewise: the delusion can not exist, but the corruption must exist likewise: for it is out of the same matter that both evils are created /engendered/.
Not so Fiction. Without Fiction, corruption and delusion might have done their worst
Fiction it is it is a production of peculiarly English growth. In the Roman Law the word may here and there be seen.
[xxxvi. 168]
1822 July 19
Constitut. Code Rationale
Supreme Operative?
I Monarch
Instruments
Fiction
Fiction.
Consideranda in relation to it
1. Evils produced by it, considered in a general point of view
2. By whom employed.
3. To whose benefit employed.
4 For whose benefit employed
5. At whose expence employed.
6. Occasions on which it has been employed: i.e. Parts of the field of Legislation to which application has been made of it.
?.1. Evils produced by it
1. In general all the evils of Misrule. Falshood is essentially an instrument of evil: an instrument adapted generally to the purposes of all evil-doers as such. When he by whom it is employed is a functionary, especially a Judicial functionary of the highest order, it is a case the evil receives an aggravation: and so does the turpitude of the evil-doer.
2. Debasement of the moral part of the mental frame of all those by whom application is made of it
3. Debasement of the intellectual part of the mental frame of all those upon whom the imposition passes, and by whom the lie uttered in place of a reason is accepted as constituting a reason, and that a sufficient one
4 The several particular evils operated by means of it. These will be determined by the several parts of the field to which application has been made of it
5. In general it may be stated as an instrument of arbitrary power: invented by functionaries invested with limited power for the purpose of breaking through the limits by which was intended to be circumscribed.
[036-169v]
1821 Nov r 26 /Dec r 23[?]/ /1822 Feb. 13/
Codification Offer
'.5. Admission Universal
Objections answered
4. For Draughtsmanship, a foreigner as such, affords peculiar promise. Cause or reason - Exception from the sinister action of native particular interest and prejudices
So much for a general and preparatory intimation. Clear, correct or adequately comprehensive the idea thus conveyed can not as yet be expected to be. To invest it with those several qualities will be the endeavour of the ensuing pages.
First as to singleness in preference to multiplicity of hands.
6. Objection 6. The open mode is ineffectual to its proposed purpose. Be the draughts ever so numerous, the constituted authorities will still do with them as they please. Of each draught, they will make more or less use, or no use at all, as best suits their views: by the supposition no more on this occasion than on any other are they subject to any legal controul.
Answer. True: not to any controul other than that moral controul which is applied by the tribunal of public opinion. But this controul it is the design, and will be the effect of the proposed open mode to apply in the most efficient manner: and be it or be it not sufficient the situation of the authorities in question puts an exclusion upon every other. In what way, in the instance of every rationalized code, the rationale interwoven with it will operate in the character of a bridle has been shewn above: (See Sections 2 and 3:) as also upon whom it thus operates. In every aptly penned draught the constituted authorities whose decision it will call for will see and feel a bridle: a bridle which they will be restrained from treating it with neglect: a bridle the power of which will be in proportion to its aptitude. In the text itself, were that all, their power would feel a snaffle: and to this snaffle a curb is added by the rationale. Take the case of the Representatives of the people. By and by come the Elections: and then come questions upon questions to them. Here is this draught (naming it): in it were all these good things naming them). All neglected: and your will /you/ for the neglect, or you let it pass without voting against it. What have you to say for yourself?
[xxxvi. 169]
1822 July 22
Supreme Operative
Concluding Aphorisms
Aphorisms, at the commencement or at the conclusion
1. In the scale of appropriate moral aptitude (a) - Note aptitude with relation to the functions of a functionary of government in a government having for its ground the greatest happiness principle a mans altitude is, naturally speaking, inversely as his altitude in the scale of prosperity, meaning that which is composed of the contiguous and conjunct scales of power, opulence and factitious honor
2 So, in the scale of appropriate intellectual aptitude: necessary external means of information being supposed equal
3 So in the scale of appropriate active aptitude.
4. On all three accounts taken together, the place of the absolute Monarch will in the aggregate of the three scales of appropriate aptitude, be naturally be at the lowest degree /point/
5. The place of the limited Monarch will naturally be at a point above that of the absolute Monarch but below that of a member of a purely Aristocratical government
6. Among Limited Monarchs the place of each one in the aggregate scale of appropriate aptitude will be inversely as his altitude in the scale of prosperity, and in particular as his altitude in the scale of power: directly as the quantity substracted from his power by the aggregate of the limitations annext /applying/ to it
7. The place of a Member of a purely Aristocratical government will naturally be above that of a Limited Monarch but below that of an average individual belonging to the class of supremely ruling /those/ functionaries among whom supreme rule is shared.
[xxxvi. 170]
1822 July 22
Constitut. Code Rationale
Supreme Operative
Concluding Aphorisms
8. In the particular scale of appropriate moral aptitude The place of a Member of a
purely Aristocratical government will naturally be even below that of the most
mischievous of those commonly designated by the name /common appellative/ of
malefactors: and the importance of this branch of appropriate aptitude being in
comparison of the two others so much /superior/ greater thereby also in the aggregate
scale of appropriate aptitude.
9. The place of the Member of a supremely operative Representative body in a
Representative body in the aggregate scale of appropriate aptitude, will naturally be
above that of an average individual taken from the class of non-functionaries
[xxxvi. 171]
1822 July 24
Constitut. Code Rationale
Supreme Constitutive in people
Supreme Operative?
Enmity between high and low
is not reciprocal
Every where it has been seen with the single exception of a well /an aptly/ organized
Representative Democracy, the ruling and influential few are enemies of /to/ the subject
many: enemies in mind as well as in act, and by the very nature of man until the
government whatever it be has given way to a Representative Democracy unchangeable
/perpetual and implacable/ enemies.
Not so the subject many to the ruling and influential few the enmity is not reciprocal:
it is all of it on one side. on that one side only.
The subject many are every where both oppressing and plundering the subject many. The
subject many have neither the expectation nor the desire of oppressing or plundering the
rich /wealthy/. Oppress them they could not without plundering them without plundering
them of all they have: for without any factitious power, that is to say official power
their, their wealth can not but protect them - protect them most effectually against
oppression in every shape
Plunder the wealthy few: the subject many could not by any general resumption or /and
new/ division of property, for by any such attempt every thing valuable and all property
in it would be destroyed: that of the poorest as well as that of the most wealthy.
As little could they in the way of taxation: taking this or that part instead of the
whole. For between wealthy and not wealth there being no line of separation actual or
practicable, the less rich could not be taxed without the taxing of the more rich
likewise.
In the Anglo-American United States the class who with relation to the purpose in
question are without property - that is to say without property sufficient for their
maintenance, have for upwards of forty years by means of the right of electing the
possessors of the Supreme Operative power had the property of the wealthy within the
compass of their legal power: in what instance has any infringement of property been
ever made?
[036-172v]
1821. Nov r. 9th.
Codification Offer
Abridgm t.
' 9. Draughtsman gratuitous
'.1. Gratuitous what.
Reward factitious - what
Abstractedly considered, reward in this shape may seem capable of being ranked under the denomination of factitious reward: but, considered in its application to the sort of service here in question, presenting itself without need of promise, as it will naturally be apt to do to all eyes, - it may on this account be referred to the head of natural reward. Unexpensive, if not strictly speaking gratuitous, may the service be stiled, at any rate: because, from remuneration given in this shape no additional expence to government, no additional burthen to the people, is the result.
As in Spain and Portugal, so in every other country in which the business of legislation is in the hands of a body of Representatives chosen by the people, that part of the business, which consists in the preparation of any such body of proposed law for the consideration of the whole Assembly, will be in the hands of a select few, under the name of a Commission or Committee. In any such hands, attaching to the exercise of this function, any specially appointed factitious reward, in the shape of pay, or in any other shape, is as far from being customary, and thence from being probable, as it is from being eligible.
But it has been shewn that in hands so situated, the business, of preparing a proposed Code in the first instance for the consideration of the whole body, could not, although in appearance ever so gratuitously performed, be lodged without the most serious inconvenience.
The hands so situated being supposed rejected, hence the necessity of looking out for others. To these extraneous hands, factitious reward, in some shape or other, at the expence of the public, will either be given, or not. If it be given, the case is a case of patronage; and the number of those by whom it shall be capable of being received, must of course be limited: if it be not given, reward being in the natural shape offered to view, but in no other, the number of those to whose eyes the prospect of it is opened, and whose service in the shape in question may be obtained, is naturally unlimited: and in this case patronage bas no place.
On