1822 July 7
Constitut. Code
Established Religion none
True - Judge's being a thief no reason why a thief should not be punished
Accordingly in no instance has a system in regard to Religion been ever established but for the purpose as well as with the effect of its being made an instrument of intimidation, corruption and delusion for the purpose /support/ of depredation and oppression, in the hands of the government.
[037-170v]
1821 June 8
Codification Offer
'.5. Draughtsman single
In this case, From plurality as opposed to unity, two distinguishable sorts of bad effects (it may have been observed) have been brought to view. The one applies to offices in general; and is composed produced by the want of restraint as applied to ill desert, and the want of encouragement to extra good desert, with a reference to public service taken at large. The other, applies in a more particular matter to the particular function here in question: it consists in the multiplication given to the number of persons prone to the making sacrifice of the universal to sinister & particular interests & prejudices: and thence to the number and extent of those sacrifices:- sacrifices the extent of which, taken in their totality, is when compared with that of the correspondent sacrifices capable of being made in the course of the business of any ordinary office, a infinity to one.
[037-226v]
1821 May 14
Codification Offer.
'.4/5/. Draughtsman single
Such has been the language, where and when on the part of the ruling one, any such condescension towards what concerns the subject many, as that of considering their happiness worth a thought, is vouchsafed to be manifested. This is however the extraordinary case: it is the case which naturally has place only in that sort of Monarchy alone in which the throwing, over the native colours of selfish tyranny, a varnish of hypocrisy is regarded as necessary, or at least conducive, to the only end, which, under a Monarchy, ever has been or in the nature of man ever can be really pursued - by the had of it.
This then is but the extraordinary case. In the ordinary case no such disguise being regarded as necessary, no such humiliation as that of putting it on is submitted to. To all such degrading and unworthy compliances, two aptly nebulous, and preeminently appropriate words legitimacy and order - both or either of them - form a less assailable - a more dignified, a more awe-striking, and in every point of view a more advantageous, substitute. By the word legitimacy intimation is given of the right, which in quality of representative of the heavenly Monarch the earthly Monarch possesses, of converting into instruments of his own glory, all men that are or can be made to be subject to his power: by the word order is depicted, at one tenth of the pencil, the state of things which that subjection or in the words of the present Bishop of London, speaking from the Episcopal pulpit the "prostration of understanding and will is compleat." As to any such object as that of the happiness of the individuals in question, no more regard is manifested by it, than if, instead of sensitive matter, these instruments of the Vice-God's glory were made of the same materials as the stocks and stones of which his palace is composed.
1822 Feb. 10
Codif/Constitutional Law/
Supreme Constitutive who
'2. Means of Government
This comes immediately after '.1. Government what - ends of government proper and sinister
'.2. Means of Government - means best adapted to that end
The powers by the exercise of which government is carried on can not be exercised by all in the same manner at the same time. To say /Any such proposition [...?]/ that is the best government in which the powers of government are all of them exercised by all the members of the community at the same time would be a self-contradictory proposition - by it would be asserted the existence of a government and at the same time in the same community the non-existence of all /any /government.
The exercise of the powers of government consists in the giving of directions or commands injunctive /positive/ and prohibitive and incidentally for securing compliance through administering /applying/ rewards and punishments and rewards
In and by every such exercise is implied the separation of the members of the community at each point of time is implied a separation of the whole number of the members of the community into two classes: namely the governors and the government: the rulers and those over whom rule is exercised.
But though consistently with the continued existence of government it is not possible /impossible/ that the separation should as to the two classes themselves be otherwise than perpetual /short of perpetual,/ not so is the existence of the same individual in both those classes so it be at different points of time: of each class the whole population might migrate into the other: Those who are all of them governors at one moment may be all of them governed and not governors during the second moment: while those who are governed during the first moment may be all of them governors during the second moment.
1822 Feb. 10
Constitutional Law /Code/
Supreme Constitutive who
'2. Means of Government
In comparison of the governed the governors must in every community be a small number - for those by whom the operations of government are carried on can not during that time be carrying on operations of any other sort: those excepted by which the individual and thus by which the species are preserved. For the greatest portion of the labouring time of the greatest number must at all times be employed in the securing of the means of subsistence to the whole
By whom then and how shall this distinction be made? By what cause or causes shall it be determined who at each moment shall be the governor, and who the governed?
The greatest happiness of the greatest number requires that be the governors who they may - be the powers of government exercised by them what they may, it is by /of/ the will of the governed that during each moment their existence in that situation should be he result:- that is to say that after having been placed they should at certain intervals of no great length be displaceable by the governed.
The governed can not all of them be at all times exercising the immediate powers of government, as above specified /particularized/ but at stated times they may all of them exercise the functions of declaring who the individuals shall be by whom those same immediate powers shall be exercised.
1822 Feb. 10
Constitutional Code
Supreme Constitutive who
'2. Means of Government
The happiness of all the governed of the subject many will at all times it is manifest be in a great degree dependent on the conduct maintained by the governors, by the ruling few in the exercise of the powers of government as above particularized. As On every occasion His own greatest happiness is the object or end towards which the exercise of the active faculties of every individual during every moment will be directed, so on this occasion: the causing those individuals to be in the situation of the ruling few by whose conduct in such their situation his own happiness will according to his judgment be most effectually promoted /encreased/.
If there was any other individual or set of individuals by whose conduct in the exercise of the powers of government the abovementioned only right and proper end of government were in a greater degree likely to be in a greater degree promoted /fulfilled/ than by the greatest number as above such other individual or individuals would be those in whose hands the principle of the greatest happiness would require that the exercise of those same powers should be lodged /performed/. But these are not nor in the nature of man can be any such other individual or set of individuals. Take for example any one such individual: to the giving every possible encrease to his own happiness whatever becomes of the happiness of others would the exercise of the powers of government in his hands be during every moment of his time be directed. But in propor[tion] as his own happiness received encrease would the aggregate happiness of all the governed be diminished.
1822 Feb. 10
Constitutional Code
Supreme Constitutive who
'2. Means of Government
True it is that as in the case of the supposed individual not chosen by the governed nor by any portion of the governed so by every individual chosen by them would his own happiness in the same way be endeavoured to be encreased whatsoever should become of their happiness. But as in the case supposed each such member of the ruling few not only was placed but at a short interval is displaceable by the subject many, what he sees from first to last is that any considerable and lasting sacrifice of their happiness to his own is impracticable: and that for any attempt to effect it, he would at any rater after his departure out of such situation be liable for such his misconduct to be punished by persons appointed by them for that purpose, in the same way that during his continuance in power others were liable to be punished at his hands. He will not therefore in any such way throw away /expend/ any of his labour /in waste/: he will not encounter any such risk.
1822 Feb. 10
Constitutional Code
Supreme Constitutive who
'2. Means of Government
Thus it is that with reference to the appointment /choice/ of those by whom the powers of government shall be exercised among the elements of appropriate aptitude appropriate moral aptitude can not on the part of the greatest number /subject many/ be deficient: on the contrary in their instance as compared with all other individuals whatsoever, it is at its maximum.
True it is that if on the part of any other individual or set of individuals were in existence in whose instance appropriate moral aptitude not being inferior, appropriate intellectual aptitude were superior, in such other individual or individuals would the maximum of the aggregate of appropriate aptitude with reference to the exercise of the power in question have place. But in vain would be the search for any other such individual or individuals.
1821 April 26
First Lines
Constitutional
Supreme power
Appointment and Removal
In the case of the Supreme power under a Democracy - a /[...?]/ Representative Democracy - for the mode of appointment, including in it /as it does, as the result of one and the same operative/ the mode of removal, the leading principles have been already given.
In this instance and this alone it is manifest that those two intimately connected powers can not be in other than the same hands.
In the case of the judiciary Establishent, what is proposed is that the power of appointment being in a single hand, the power of removal shall be in the hands of a numerous body exercised the same as that in which the right of appointment and thereby in conjunction with it the power of removal with relation to the Members of the body by which the supreme operative power in the state is exercised, - that this power be in those same hands and exercised, as nearly as the nature of the case admitts, in the same manner. For the scheme of distribution thus composed - and for each of its two so intimately connected yet so perfectly distinguishable and separable parts, reasons have on that particular occasion been given. Though not as an original to be copied for the several other commonly distinguished and separated departments of Government - and for the several distinguishable branches of constitutional law applying to those several departments, - this same scheme of distribution, though not in the character of an original to be copied, absolutely and compleatly copied - yet, in the character of a precedent and standard to be referred to, and in that of a source of information to be drawn upon may, it is hoped, be employed not without advantage. In so far as the same circumstances have place, the same reasons will apply, and the same arrangements may be employed to advantage: proportion /in so far/ ascircumstances differ, reasons will differ, and different arrangements will require to be employed.
1821. April 28.
First Lines
Constitutional
Any further instructions or observations relative to these two correspondent and antagonizing powers /forces/ - viz. the power of appointment and the power of removal, as applied to the above several seats of subordinate power would spread too much into detail to admitt of intention in any outline such as the present